AfD Bundestag Delegation, July, 2025.
To shape Germany politically – the end of the firewall and the way to government responsibility.
Ideas and proposals for a strategy process of the AfD Bundestag delegation.
Introduction
The AfD achieved a great success at the last Bundestag election. It dislodged the SPD as the second strongest power in Germany and has become by far the strongest power in eastern Germany. In Germany, there is a clear middle-right majority with which the migration change and the economic change can be implemented.
Despite the great election success and the voters’ large assent, the firewall prevents a sharing in the government by the AfD, the exclusion of the AfD continues to be enforced, and the AFD is even threatened with a ban. To become a permanent people’s party, to overcome the firewall and to pave the way to government responsibility is an enormous challenge for which a strategy is required. The following paper offers proposals for an AfD delegation strategy process in the German Bundestag.
Prerequisite for the fall of the firewall and government responsibility for the AfD:
The AFD strives for government responsibility in Germany. The actions of the black-red coalition prove that neither a migration change nor an economic change is possible without the AfD as a driving power in the government. The political change in Germany is only to be achieved when the AfD overtakes the government responsibility. So that the AfD can design politically, the the firewall needs to fall.
The firewall will fall and the way for assumption of government responsibility will be open when
1. The
AfD is firmly anchored by its core voters who vote for the AfD out of adherence
and conviction, the AfD exploits additional parts of its potential, and has
clearly gained in acceptance beyond the AfD voter base (Part I).
2. Other party-overlapping coalitions are no longer possible because the rift between Union and the leftist parties can no longer be bridged (Part II).
In the following will be sketched possible ways of creating the prerequisites for such a scenario.
Part I. Create majorities – the people for the government responsibility won by the AfD.
For the analysis, we separate into three relevant groups the electorate for the AfD: The AfD’s voter base, the AfD’s potential, and the scope of acceptance [Akzeptanzumfeld].
To the AfD’s voter base belong those who with great certainty vote for the AfD and can be permanently united to the AFD.
The potential are those voters who basically can imagine themselves voting for the AfD and who also are attainable as possible voters.
The scope of acceptance are those voters who do not vote for the AfD and do not intend doing so, yet under certain circumstances may welcome or at least do not reject a government participation by the AfD.
According to INSA, the AfD’s voter base is around 18 percent; additionally, with the present voters and the potential voters, the AfD could achieve up to 30 percent of votes. Yet even if the AfD completely exploited its potential, that is no guaranty for the end of the firewall and a participation in government. In addition, there needs be a scope of acceptance which indeed does not vote for the AfD, but is not unfavorably opposed to a participation in government by the AfD.
So that the AfD can attain government responsibility in Germany and shape the Politik in Germany, it needs to permanently unite to itself its voter base, exploit the greater portion of its potential, and expand and attain a basic acceptance of its participation in legislation and government. For all three groups, voter base, potential, scope of acceptance, the AfD requires a differentiated strategy.
1. Unite base voters: Ostdeutsche, workers, rural area, young
voters, Russlanddeutsche.
The goal is to create a tight milieu anchoring and a permanent voter base. Voters should not vote for the AFD primarily out of protest or frustration, but because they identify themselves with the AfD. In the following milieus and regions, a tighter anchoring is already visible:
Ostdeutsche, workers, citizens in villages and small and mid-sized cities, Russlanddeutsche and Germans from the post-Soviet space, and first time voters, especially young men.
So as to permanently unite the voter base to the AfD and to strongly anchor the AfD in these milieus, the delegation prepares in three areas:
The AfD delegation identifies the political interests and problems of these groups and develops concrete legislative initiatives which therein aim to accomplish the base voters’ concrete interests and to improve their living situation.
The AfD identifies the channels of communication and creates referral networks so as to continually and permanently communicate with the base voters.
The AFD works towards a positive self-image of the base voters and their sense of life which is tightly bound with the AfD.
The AfD directs to this purpose work groups which identify the interests of base voters, develops a communications strategy, and draws up a positive picture of these groups; for example, workers as the providers of performance, Ostdeutsche as an avant garde of democracy and freedom, rural people as carriers of good, traditional values, young Germans as bearers of hope of a better future. Thus shall be developed a common AfD purpose image as a free, conservative people’s party which embraces its voter coalition.
2. Identify potential: Over-60
generation, women, academics, churched [kirchcennahe]
Christians, big cities.
In regards specific groups, the election results clearly lagged behind. The following groups can be identified in which the AFD has not exploited its potential and which represent a large portion of the German people:
Women, citizens with a college education, citizens in big cities and metropolitan areas, voters over 60, and professing [konfessionsgebundene] Christians.
These groups are not homogenous and cannot be addressed as a unit. So as to increase and win for the AfD these hard-to-access groups, we require a socio-demographic micro-analysis of these groups. Partial groups need to identified to be able to build a bridge to them.
Examples of such partial groups:
A partial group of women is, for example, housewives and mothers; of academics, engineers and graduates of technical training; of big cities and metropolitan areas, citizens in focal points or outlying locales; in regards the over-60 generation, pensioners concerned about crime or older people with traditional values; and a partial group of professing Christians is conservative Protestants and Catholics.
The delegation’s work groups should deeply occupy themselves
with the social groups in which the AfD is weaker. They may identify hindrances
and problems at talks with these groups and develop solutions, find sub-groups
which may be addressed for the AfD, and propose measures for themes and a communications
strategy so as to become stronger in these groups.
Even strong elections results are no guaranty for an AfD participation in government. As important to the mobilization of base voters and to the address to potential voters are concrete public opinion indicators for the scope of acceptance: Surveys of AfD Verbot procedures, for acceptance of various forms of cooperation with the AfD, for government participation and for fundamental rejection and fear of the AfD.
The goal is to reduce below 50
percent the portion of voters who express fear of the AfD, who are for banning
the AfD and who reject a cooperation with the AfD.
For that, it is important to analyze by means of collections of public opinion which negative images, negative narratives and notions of the AfD exist, and how these are mediated and strengthened. On the basis of the knowledge is then a proper strategy developed for a targeted counter-communication which refutes the arguments against the AfD, a positive purpose image developed, and proposals formulated on how the scope of acceptance can be clearly enlarged. The target groups of our efforts for enlarging the scope of acceptance are:
Citizens who do not belong to the voter base or the potential of the AfD, and whose rejection on the basis of their ideological location and party affiliation is not insurmountable.
Part II. Split
black-red – Prevent party-overlapping coalitions.
Majorities without the AfD were hitherto possible by means of party-overlapping coalitions, coalitions of the Union with the SPD or Greens. The firewall will fall when these political options have failed and are no longer possible. In the end, the Ampel broke down because the opposition between the expectations of the FDP”s bürgerliche voters and those of red-green were ultimately no longer bridgeable. The conflict potential between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, especially between the conservative market economy wing of the Union and the SPD-Linke, is especially great. The AfD has two ways to enlarge these rifts:
1. The polarization of debate leads to the separation of bürgerliche-conservative camps from leftist radical camps: The demarcation [Abgrenzung] of the radical leftists, who for the majority of Germans represent unacceptable positions, facilitates the AfD positioning itself as a bürgerliche-conservative power. The strengthening of the radical leftists proceeds at the cost of the SPD and Greens, and forces these onto a course which makes the agreements with the Union considerably more difficult.
2. The pressure on the CDU/CSU increases: The AfD will launch motions and initiatives which meet with a high agreement within the Union voter base, especially the voters who voted for the CDU/CSU for a migration and economic change, yet now are disillusioned by black-red. Besides the migration change, the AfD takes in view the economic change as a central theme field so as to increase the pressure on the Union and make accessible new competences and voters for the AfD.
1. Polarization against the Linke.
1.1 Drive
forward separation of the bürgerliche-conservative
camps from Leftist camps.
Presently, polarization in Germany proceeds all too often between AfD voters and all others. Our aim is to create a situation in which the political rifts no longer run between the AfD and the other political streams, but a bürgerliche-conservative camp and a radicalizing leftist camp oppose one another, comparable to the situation in the U.S.A.
The starting point for such a development is given:
The Linke have become a driving power in the leftist camp which makes it difficult for the Greens and SPD to engage in compromises with the CDU/CSU; for example, in regards migration and economy.
The AfD and the Linke form the two ideological poles of the social argument. As a counter-pole to the ideological and woke Linke, the AfD can sharpen its bürgerliche profile.
The AfD can essentially contribute to that the argument in politics and society becomes a “duel” between the two irreconcilably opposed camps, culminating in an election between the AfD and Linke: Weidel or Reichinneck.
The consequences of this polarization already show themselves with the Bundestag election in regards the first-time voters. There, the FDP and Greens were relieved as the strongest political powers by the AfD and Linke. If this trend spreads through the entire electorate, the political poles will be stronger, the rifts between both camps greater. The rifts within the camps, such as between AfD voters and CDU/CSU voters, becomes smaller because the Linke have a strong interest in attacking even moderate conservative and CDU-like positions as being close to the AfD.
1.2 Differentiate communications strategy.
The communication needs to be thematically, rhetorically and argumentively differentiated between the argument with the opposing leftist camp and the argument within the bürgerliche-conservative camp.
The argument with the leftist camp will be conducted on a fundamental level with the central point on socio- and cultural-political basic conflicts: Family versus gender, nation versus open borders, freedom versus socialism.
The argument with the Union needs to be primarily conducted on the themes of credibility and trust, substantially [konkret] on the political failures in regards the practical implementation of the migration change and economic change.
In a Kulturkampf with the Linke, the AfD positions itself as the only relevant opposing force; as the credible original in political competition with the CDU/CSU, it delivers what the Union in the election campaign has only promised.
2. Political pressure on the Union.
2.1 The AfD
can become the strongest party with variable voters from the CDU/CSU.
In the 2025 Bundestag election, the CDU/CSU gained four million voters from the SPD, FDP and non-voters; 1.76 million voters from the SPD, 1.35 million voters from the FDP and .9 million non-voters voted for the Union. These new voters for the Union gave as a reason for the vote decision that the Union after Merkel had changed course. Economic growth, domestic security were the most important themes of the CDU/CSU voters.
If the AfD succeeded in winning these variable voters from the CDU/CSU, it will be the strongest power and expel the Union to the second place. If the AfD gained these four million voters, the absolute number of its voters climbs from ten to 14 million. That corresponds to an election result of about 28 percent, which largely corresponds to the AfD’s measured voter potential. The CDU/CSU would correspondingly lose votes and come out even worse than in 2021, as it attained with its Chancellor candidate Armin Lachet a historic low of 24 percent.
For that it may succeed in motivating these new Union voters to a change to the AfD there speaks:
That these new CDU/CSU voters have already shown themselves ready to change
That they have voted out of protest against the Ampel CDU/CSU
That they are in agreement with the AfD’s positions on domestic and economic policy
That the Union by its coalition with the SPD disillusioned these groups of voters
The way to win these earlier SPD, FDP and non-voters, who at this election gave their votes to the Union, lies in, besides the migration policy, the key question of economic competence.
The Union stands before the dilemma that compromise with the SPD makes it easy for the AfD to win these voters from the Union – the fight over these voters inevitably brings it into conflict with the SPD and Greens.
2.2 The AfD as the party of the sozial market economy: Overtake the CDU/CSU in economic competence.
The “core brand” of the CDU/CSU lies in its economic and financial competence. In the voters’ attributions of competence prior to the Bundestag election, it was far ahead of all other parties. “Economic growth” was a central motiv for the election of the CDU/CSU. The AfD strongly increased in these competence fields in the last Bundestag election, yet still lay far removed from the Union’s competence values other than in regards to that of migration where the competence attributions lay more closely one with the other.
The economic competence is the key question so as to exploit the potential, to win the Union’s variable voters, and to enlarge acceptance for the AfD’s government responsibility. The goal is to essentially reduce the Union’s margin in regards attribution of competences in the areas of economy and finance, and to conclusively overtake the Union. In the eyes of the voters, the AfD needs to stand not only for the migration change but also for the economic change.
The starting point for that is given:
The lifting of the debt brake cost the Union considerably in credibility. The growing state debt and interest burden will become in the coming years a permanent theme.
As a result of the coalition with the SPD, wide-ranging and necessary structural reforms are practically impossible. The massive problems for Germany as a business venue and for the social security system are not to be solved by the least common denominator of the CDU/CSU and SPD.
The AfD can make market economy, ordnungspolitische and financial policy demands and program points of its own without the Union, as a result of its captivity in the coalition with the SPD, being able to oppose something credible to it.
The AfD is the only party which, without regard to leftist climate discourse, can acknowledge itself for economic growth and can act in the central energy themes without ideological restrictions.
The theme of economic growth and the prosperity promises united with it, besides the themes of migration and domestic security, can be an additional mainstay for the AfD, and at the same time be the clothes pin between the AfD’s various voter groups: From the unemployed to workers to the self-employed, from the former SPD to the former FDP voters, and also thereby for CDU/CSU’s variable voters.
3. Foreign policy should create no additional problems.
The base electorate as well as the AfD’s potential voters are primarily to be addressed by means of domestic and economic policy positions. The AfD’s foreign policy positioning has the duty to avoid controversies within its own electorate, to minimize areas of attack and thereby contribute to enlarging the AfD’s scope of acceptance. A duty of AfD foreign policy is to early identify the danger of potential internal conflicts and current negative effects for the AfD by a wise positioning and a stringent communication agreed to within the delegation.
Outlook: Use the members’ experience and competence.
An overall strategy, especially in regards to the many various voter groups, should use the experience and competences of the members of the Bundestag delegation. The delegation has at its disposal comprehensive knowledge from its voter circles, from the citizen contacts, and a reservoir of life and vocational experience with which that of no other delegation is comparable.
In a strategy process itself arise new ideas, especially in the address to the base voters, the potential, and the scope of acceptance, but also in regards considerations of tearing down the firewall and opening the way for government ability. Work groups for individual voter groups make it possible to speak beyond the usual snips of political themes, of access to the various target groups, and to speak of the solution of outlined problems, to use experiences, gather together ideas, to use available sources, so that they can flow into the overall strategy.
The socio-empirical evaluation and analysis and strategic adaptation is thereby a permanent duty with the goal of optimizing our result and making possible the political change in Germany.
[trans: tem]