Monday, February 21, 2022

Alexander Gauland, February 17, 2022, Russia and Ukraine

German Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 20/17, p. 1120.

Frau President. Ladies and gentlemen.

Let us for once imagine we are writing of the year 2040, and Canada for economic reasons had completed an approach to China and was prepared to conclude a military convention and place at the disposal of the Chinese fleet a base in Newfoundland. Were the U.S.A. still a great power, it would call upon the Monroe Doctrine and make clear that a foreign  power on the American continent was irreconcilable with the security interests of the U.S.A. China would likely point out to the U.S.A. that Canada was sovereign and free to determine the choice of its military alliances and that China harbors only peaceful intentions. This argument would certainly hardly make much of an impression in America. Since it is one thing to have a theoretical right according to international law and it is another, in an order of states as it is now and will remain, to assert with prudence one’s place.

Even if this appears unjust to us: Malta and China are not at all now the same in importance and power. It is thus more necessary for Malta than for China to arrange is foreign relations to be as flexible as possible. To that also plainly pertains not to unnecessarily provoke powerful neighbors.

For Russia, the Ukraine is no any-country-you-like, but part of a common past rooted in a common identity. And geopolitically, Odessa in foreign or indeed enemy hands is for Russia tolerable only with difficulty; it is the irreplaceable door for commerce with the Mediterranean area.

Here, it is not about values or ideology or form of government but about interests. It is about geopolitics. Unfortunately, we Germans forget this. It would therefore be prudent to find solutions which are admissible by the great power Russia and are acceptable to the Ukraine. A NATO membership is no benefit to this country, yet there truly is one in a perpetually guaranteed status of neutrality, as there is in distinctive ways for Finland and Austria.

In foreign policy, a lesser can often be a more, and a secured existence between the fronts healthier than an endless conflict. Yes, the Ukraine has the right to freely choose its alliances. Yet how it customarily makes use of this in regards its neighbor may decide between success and failure for its still young statehood. Therefore, the West should avoid everything which makes of this crisis an instrument for a cheap triumph over Russia, and urgently advise against the Ukraine becoming a geopolitical part of the West [Drucksache 20/703].

In the long term, a European order of peace is to be realized only with Russia, and never against its interests. The motion of the CDU/CSU we will therefore naturally reject. In regards the motion of the Linke, we will abstain, since it contains correct elements.

I am grateful.

 

[trans: tem]