Monday, December 21, 2020

Gerold Otten, December 9, 2020, Budget – Defense

German Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 19/198, pp. 24989-24990.

Herr President. Right honorable colleagues.

Compared to 2013, the Defense budget for 2021 has been increased around 9 billion euros to almost 47 billion euros. The Grand Coalition’s defense politicians will here praise themselves for that. Yet how does the Bundeswehr stand after seven years of the Grand Coalition, and who bears responsibility for today’s condition of the troops?

The Bundeswehr through the years, under the euphemism of a “peace dividend”, has frankly been economized into ruin [kaputtgespart]. It will take decades to rescind this development and modernize the Bundeswehr so that it can again perform its constitutional duty, the defense of Germany.

The Bundeswehr’s 2018 capability profile sought to take this diagnosis into account and to draw up a recovery plan for the armed forces. Allow me to continue with this medical metaphor. A decade and a half of being doctored-around – rather in this case, Merkeled-around – requires at least a decade and a half of healing. It is thus also not difficult to predict that it is not possible that the body of empty structures becomes what is desired. What is today put off, remains and will thus more heavily burden future budgets.    

Yet that no recovery of Patient Bundeswehr is within sight may also therein lie that the doctors  who dispense the medicine are the same who have made him sick. Since it is so – you cannot shirk this responsibility – : CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP and Greens have to answer for the years of the Bundeswehr’s chronic illness.

The fact is: The Bundeswehr, in this state, is not in condition to defend our country. The troops, with your run-down material, are not at all in condition to smoothly organize crisis missions at the same time as basic operations here at home, despite the model and engaged commitment of our soldiers and civilian co-workers, whom and for which we expressly thank. Presently, basic operations moreover are not to be thought of. The troops at this time perform their mission against Covid-19 splendidly; but they have become a stop-gap which must jump in where other state authorities have been overwhelmed or simply refuse.

Symbolic of the Bundeswehr’s chronic illness are the problems occurring on all sides in regards the large procurement projects. For this review, let them appear in five categories. They are, on one side, the dead – failed projects like Pegasus – , then those in a trance, thus those past due like the tactical air defense system, TLVS. Not to be forgotten is the third category: The non-sellers, as for example, the A400M – actually a very capable military transport aircraft which unfortunately is not for sale on the world market. The number of projects not brought to maturity is also large, as for example, the Puma armored personnel carrier, also happily named “banana projects”, since they ripen just in time for sale. And the best for last: European prestige projects like the FCAS [Future Combat Air System] and MGCS [Main Ground Combat System] – both predominantly German-financed for predominantly French interests, political purpose thereby surmounting financial, economic and military use.  

Ladies and gentlemen, as before, a powerful investments backlog prevails in the Bundeswehr, whether it now be in housing, be it the munitions and spare parts supply, be it the preparations of personnel, be it the re-attainment of lost capabilities or the research of future technologies. All of them yield no accounting in the 2021 budget. With regard to the rapidly increasing state debt, the question moreover arises how much of the future budget increases, if they then will be made, are to be available for investment expenditures.

The result of previous armaments projects can thus be overlooked. Parallel to that, for years one reform of the procurement system follows the next. Yet where remain the efficiency increases in the procurement system? The system is imprisoned in formalism, stuck between an inhibiting over-regulation, time-consuming bureaucracy and a chronic lack of workforce. Yet one impression continues to apply: Either the system cannot reform itself, or it does not want to.

The central question is however: The armed forces are actually for what purpose? The answer to this question separates the souls. The central distinction between us, the AfD delegation, and you, the here already long dealing delegations, is very distinct: The AfD thereby pursues a realistic policy course.              

                Tobias Pflügler (Linke): That was good!

I can only say to the colleagues: The trip to Moscow was concerned with Realpolitik. For the Bundeswehr, that means: The core duty is the defense of the country and the defense of the alliance. To make this credible, a will and a capability are required, ultimately to employ lethal military force. A strong Bundeswehr serves at the same time the defense of Germany as it does that of our allies. It makes clear Germany’s credibility as an alliance partner and underpins the foreign policy capability of our country.

Foreign missions in our view are however only justified if a UN mandate is issued and a national interest has been presented. That is the leitmotiv of every reasonable nation on this planet; only in Germany, emphasis of a national interest up to now is disreputable and politically most highly suspect.  

You know all that, yet out of fear of the left-green publicized opinion, you shrink away from clear words and base the existence of the armed forces on meaningless phrases and empty cant like “Germany’s international responsibility”, “crisis management” and “humanitarian aid” or – especially beloved – a “networked approach” [„vernetzter Ansatz“]. The terms however have nothing to do with the core duty of the armed forces and of a defense alliance. This might be comprehensible in regards the self-renunciation of the pacifist portion of the population in our country; in terms of state policy, it is in no way responsible.

According to Carl von Clausewitz, the great Prussian army reformer, a state needs two things to be able to deal as an individual state with foreign countries: A government of assured management and a – I cite – “spirit of the people which gives life and strength of nerve to this whole” [„Geist des Volkes, welcher diesem Ganzen Leben und Nervenkraft gibt“]. As what concerns the Federal government, there is in this regard nothing to expect and as concerns its mental and moral capability, I see black. The one is the material and financial equipment of the armed forces, the other however is the will to fight [Wehrwille] which even to that whole gives life and strength of nerve, as Clausewitz expressed it.

I thank you for your attention. We reject Section 14.

 

[trans: tem]