Peter Boehringer
Bank Merger
German Bundestag, March 20, 2019,
Plenarprotokoll 19/88, pp. 10434-10435
[Peter
Boehringer is an Alternative für Deutschland Bundestag member from the southern
German state of Bavaria. He is a businessman, investor and author and is
currently chairman of the Bundestag budget committee. He here comments on the
proposed merger of the Deutsche Bank and the Commerzbank.]
Some things were said, and some were also
right. Yes, here once again threatens a violation of the, since 2010,
ostensibly ironclad ordnungspolitischen principles
“Never again bail-outs with tax money” and “Never again banks that are ‘Too Big
to Fail’”. Yes, it’s about up to 30,000 jobs. And yet the federal government
and officials of the Union delegation stonewall information even though on the
exchange and generally in the media it is completely clear that the Finance
Ministry is the active driver of the merger talks.
Today in the budget committee Minister Scholz
earnestly maintained that the Commerzbank is regarded only as a financial
investment, which is laughable. This line is followed in the media even though
the opposite is piped from the rooftops by the sparrows. Only two mentions in
the media: Scholz Applies Pressure, State Secretary Kukies Drives Merger Talks
Forward. It has even been officially stated that there have been 23 meetings
between the referred to banks and the BMF. The issue cries out for review by
the Bundestag. For all that, the Commerzbank is already partly nationalized
with the Ankeraktionär Bund.
I however now focus on what has been too
little spoken of in the media, though which in my opinion are the decisive
points: First, the true origin of these talks, the rosey-red elephant in the
room, is the EU-ropean prime rate, squeezed to nearly zero by the manipulations
of the EZB. This zero interest rate is the principle origin of the banks’
earnings problems. It has in fact been acknowledged that the banks expect an
earnings decline from interest revenue in 2019 of 13 percent compared with
2018. This revenue contributes to over 70 percent of the banks’ profits. A bank
in this situation can no longer earn. Given these EU-made problems, a merger
generally changes nothing.
Second: There is here the threat of a
backdoor, partial nationalization of the Deutsche Bank – and even one by means
of a double backdoor. Through one will be tossed an indirect and inconspicuous
line of liquidity and, ultimately, liablity and rescue to the Deutsche Bank by
the merger with the already nationalized Commerzbank. Through the other, the
government’s share of the banks shall be held in the future by the KfW – and thus chiefly by the
German state household, beyond
parliamentary control. This is parallel to the permanent rescue of the euro
which always again uses precisely this same principle: by means of a special
vehicle, sufficient funds will be raised, always again to be in fact guaranteed
by German credit. And because the KfW is one of the very few banks in Germany
that still has much money and, thanks to the liablity of the German taxpayer, a
AAA rating, shall it now stand in the breach. Thereby shall be secured the
new Great Bank’s future capital increases, which are coming as
surely as the next EZB euro rescue installment, and which will be a burden of
billions. I cannot yet prove this but we here will again be speaking.
The BMF must no longer stonewall the
following quite justified questions. They do not concern the negotiating
positions of the referred to banks and they do not disturb any ad hoc reporting
duties – to forestall the argument, Frau State Secretary, that is presumably
coming.
First: Shall public funds be newly
appropriated? We must be allowed to put these questions and we are indeed quite
presumptuous. The [Ankeraktionär] Bund presumably must secure all the
risks of this merger with billions in tax money. Just as the permanent euro
rescue has functioned for years with German credit, shall it also here become
the royal way. Otherwise, nothing works. The capital markets implicitly
acknowledge this state guarantee. You know that, everyone at the exchange knows
it. Yet the German taxpayer will not be informed…
Second: Why should a partly nationalized champion be more
economic? That has always gone awry. I reference the French experiences of the
1980s and naturally the many unspeakable disasters of the Landesbanken. Surely the BMF with Minister Scholz at the helm
should properly know – HSH Nordbank with its 14 billion euro tax disaster – how
state intervention in the banking sector works; namely, it doesn’t. It always goes
awry. Herr Müller – you preceded me as speaker – it is not over; it is only
beginning! This is pure state interventionism. We shall witness it.
This merger will be too complex, too opaque and too expensive.
That is even the view of colleagues in your own ranks. Herr Michelbach, Herr
Rehberg and Herr Jäger of the Union are sceptical and also the ranking SPD member
on the finance committee, colleague Binding, has expressed scepticism.
Hans Michelbach
(CDU/CSU): The economic wise men!
I have only said “sceptical”. What you are actually saying, Herr
Michelbach, I naturally do not know. But you have expressed yourself as
sceptical, as some of the other colleagues have done.
Lastly, there is yet a ceterum
censeo – nothing new, but to this context, well suited: Finally fill the
positions, crying out to be filled, on the banking and finances commission [gremium] with officials of the AfD. The
information pertinent to these mergers will be discussed there and be made
accessible and known to this house. It is a scandal for democracy that the
colleagues Münz and Glaser have still not been elected to this commission.
Stephan Brandner
(AfD): Tomorrow!
We give you an opportunity to do so tomorrow.
Stephan Brandner
(AfD): Ja!
Hearty thanks.
[Translated by Todd Martin]
