German Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 19/229, p.
29299.
Herr President. Ladies and gentlemen.
One need not agree with every formulation of the Linke’s
motions to hold their intentions to be correct. Ever since the days of Frederick
the Great, it goes well for Germany and the Germans when they have a good
relation with Russia. That applies to the time of the Wars of Liberation as to
the Bismarckian unification of the Reich, to the Rapallo Treaty as to the
re-unification.
Hitler’s madness and his crimes were in this case an
aberration from the Prussian-German tradition. And in that since the days of Gorbachev
we no longer have geo-strategic conflicts with Russia, Bismarck’s warning to
never let the line to St. Petersburg be broken actually needs might have been
self-fulfilling.
That this is not so now in no way lies only on the Russian
side. In the old Federal Republic, the opinion was widespread that the times of
geopolitics were past. Jürgen Habermas designated geopolitics as “tamtam”.
Following the ravages of the Third Reich, many Germans wanted most gladly to
renounce foreign policy. Politicians like Hans-Dietrich Genscher spoke of “world
domestic policy”.
Today we know that these were wishful dreams. Geopolitics
has never disappeared; it had never disappeared. We are presently experiencing
the ascent of an unearthly [unheimlichen]
world power, while the previous hegemon loses influence and, in regards
domestic policy, is threatened by conflicts similar to civil war. Besides these
two is meantime the great power, Russia, the conduct of which often leaves us
clueless.
Yes, one can – or must – name the annexation of Crimea a
violation of international law, even when historically there is much to be said
for the Russian position.
Manuel Sarrazin (Greens): Rather for the Greek!
Yet we need also ask ourselves whether the expansion of NATO – colleague Hampel has just spoken of it – up to the borders of Russia does not – as the negotiations leader, Horst Teltschik, is convinced – contradict the intentions expressed in the scope of the re-unification negotiations.Still more problematic is the new situational thinking [Lagerdenken]: Here Western-democratic,
there authoritarian. We must now for once deal with the fact that two world
powers, China and Russia, reject the Western model. Yet in that we postulate
the legitimacy of this model for the whole world, we drive Russia, despite its
European tradition, into the arms of China.
Instead of changing Russia’s foreign policy by which we do
not place in discussion its domestic order, we attempt to correct this
according to our sense, which leads to a further hardening of foreign policy. China’s
ascent thereby certainly makes clear that the Western assumption of a necessary
liberalization by progressive economic success, as was once expected by the
American economist Galbraith, was a false speculation which obviously does not
function in other than Western social models.
Therefore, ladies and gentlemen, it would be sensible and
correct to give up this policy and again turn back to a traditional policy of
reasons of state and there to only attack Russia where it violates our
geo-strategic and economic interests. The domestic order of a country should
alone be determined by the citizens of that country, and even when, as in the
Navalny affair, our sense of right is violated.
The states and societies of this world are too distinctive
to let themselves be trimmed to the model of Westminster.
I am grateful for the attention.
[trans: tem]
