Joachim Wundrak, June 13, 2024, Arms Exports to Israel

German Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 20/175, p. 22716. 

Frau President. Ladies and gentlemen. A special greeting first of all to our guests from Thüringen in the gallery. 

But to the matter. The motion put forward demands stopping German armaments exports to Israel and imposing a weapons embargo against Israel. Israel has been accused of committing violations of humanitarian international law and of human dignity by its type of war conduct against Hamas in the Gaza strip. 

In that regard is to be called to mind and retained that Hamas and Iran deny Israel’s right to exist and routinely call for the annihilation of Israel – as in the act committed by the brutal massacre of October 7 of the past year, and by a perfidious plan of Hamas, namely, to force the Arab world into a war against Israel on the basis of an expected high number of Palestinian victims as a result of a harsh Israeli reaction. This perfidious plan of the Hamas leadership in a first stage has unfortunately unfolded. The high numbers of Palestinian victims and the extensive destruction of infrastructure in the Gaza strip are tolerable only with difficulty. The developing humanitarian crisis in Gaza has shaken the world. 

In the course of this war against Hamas, Israel has raised up against itself many critics due to its harsh and uncompromising way of proceeding, as the proposed motion rightly describes. And the protective power, the U.S.A., has increasingly criticized the Israeli government and demanded that international law be observed and disproportionate war conduct be avoided. Finally, the U.S.A. has evidently even imposed a delivery stop for one type of munition, namely heavy bombs, so as to compel a moderation on the Israeli war leadership. To what extent the Federal Government [of Germany] has joined in this delivery stop of specified weapons or munitions has not been publicly communicated. 

With the Security Council decision, reached a few days ago, for a three-stage armistice plan, to which Israel agreed, there since long is now hope in a rapid end of the death and the destruction. We may nevertheless not ignore that Israel is existentially threatened also on its northern border. Hezbollah, armed to the teeth, presents an incomparably higher threat for Israel than does Hamas. 

Israel remains reliant on its military strength which is dependent on German armaments exports. We therefore reject the proposed motion. 

I thank you for your attention. 

 

[trans: tem]

Joachim Wundrak, April 11, 2024, Arctic Strategy

German Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 20/163, pp. 21013-21014. 

Frau President. Ladies and gentlemen. 

Herr Dr. Stegner, I remain in constructive cooperation and collaboration here in this sovereign house. 

The economic and security policy importance of the Arctic region for Germany and Europe is regularly underestimated – plainly also by the Federal government. So accentuated the Federal government in an answer to a minor inquiry, that Germany’s interests in the Arctic have been primarily directed to climate and environmental policy. Yet the rich reserves of oil and gas of this region can also in the future essentially contribute to a more secure energy supply for Germany. In addition, there are at hand large deposits of valuable metals like copper, nickel and zinc, as well as rare earths, which can make a significant contribution to covering the raw materials needs of our industry. 

The guidelines of the German Arctic policy of 2019 are not fundamentally distinct from those of 2013. There were therein exhibited not any concrete steps in regards the implementation of economic and energy policy interests. Beyond that, Germany as a continental middle power and export nation needs to have a strategic interest in secure and usable maritime routes in the Arctic area. 

It is not to be wondered that competing great power interests in this region again establish an increasing military presence and activity. Thus the U.S.A. for its Thule base in Greenland concluded already in 2018 a new, well-endowed use agreement. Russia also constructs its military support points in the Arctic and carries out large exercises there. The already mentioned Arctic policy guidelines of the Federal government on the contrary reject any militarization of the Arctic. Nevertheless, the Bundeswehr for some years increasingly takes part in military exercises in the region. 

It is obvious that the present geo-strategic developments especially increase the Arctic’s importance for Germany’s security and prosperity. This enormous economic potential of the Arctic is not acknowledged by the Federal government and consequently not sufficiently taken into account in the practical policy. 

We thus demand [Drucksache 20/10972] of the Federal government to develop a new, integrated Arctic strategy which distinctly defines and pursues Germany’s interests, especially the energy policy and economic interests. As an observer at the Arctic Council and in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, Germany should moreover use its influence in the region to prevent a further escalation due to the increasing military activities. 

Germany should more intensively contribute to strengthening the Arctic Council and to solving security questions in regards the Arctic by means of dialogue and diplomacy. Beyond that, Germany should actively participate in the international Arctic forums like the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, the Euro-Arctic Barents Sea Council, the Arctic Circle, the Arctic Economic Council and the Arctic Frontiers. And finally Germany should strengthen its diplomatic engagement in the Arctic by the naming of a German commissioner with rank of ambassador. What is right for the south seas should all the more apply for the far more relevant Arctic. 

I thank you for your attention. 

            Ulrich Lechte (FDP): We’ve understood that!

 

[trans: tem]

 

Joachim Wundrak, May 10, 2023, Bundeswehr in Mali

German Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 20/102, p. 12306.

Right honorable Herr President. Ladies and gentlemen.

Already for more than a year, we of the AfD delegation clearly named the failure of the Bundeswehr’s mission in Mali and demanded the orderly withdrawal of our soldiers. I may refrain from citing to you and myself the reaction at that time from the ranks of the self-declared middle of this house. On the other hand, all European contributors of troops meanwhile have consequently converted these failures into the decision for a departure. And the large African contributors of troops have already left MINUSMA. The departure of the French, British, Swedish, Dutch, Canadians and others leaves behind on the ground considerable capability gaps which cannot be closed. The risks for our contingent thereby increase drastically.

The acknowledgment of the failures of the mission in Mali has for weeks permeated all delegations of this parliament. That is to be welcomed.

I wish to emphasize that here it is a question of a political, strategic failure for which the Bundeswehr soldiers assigned to Mali may not be reproached. These failures derive from the entire Western policy in the Sahel and especially that of the former colonial power France. Nevertheless, instead of immediately applying the logical consequence of this acknowledgment, namely to start the forthwith departure of our troops from Mali, the Federal government in the past year has further increased the size of the contingent and prepared additional capabilities for MINUSMA. On the other hand, the task fulfillment of the German MINUSMA contribution, measured by the mandate, has further receded. The relation with the Mali government has further worsened. The ruling military junta under the putschist Assimi Goita, who has named himself interim president of Mali, has meanwhile taken a clear geopolitical position on the side of Russia. The general security situation has in any case thereby worsened. Onto one side falls the pressure of the Islamist terrorists following the departure of the French and the halt proceeding therefrom of Operation Barkhane and Taskforce Takuba. On the other side, the Russian Wagner mercenary troops meanwhile with brutal means overtake the fight on the side of the Mali army and drive the people of Northern Mali into the hands of the Islamists.

In this increasingly uncontrollable and dangerous situation, the government now puts before us this singular motion which speaks of a continued task fulfillment with a simultaneous melting away of capability contributions. The previously expounded reason for the delayed departure was to make available helicopters for the rescue chain and other capabilities until the spring of 2024 for coverage of the planned elections in Mali. In the motion put forward by the Federal government, these elections as a basis for the mandate are only very vaguely mentioned; for good reason. Since no one any longer seriously believes in elections in Mali next spring.

The presented motion nevertheless leaves open when in fact begins the contingent’s transfer back and when the task fulfillment shall be discontinued. In the worst case, this means maintaining the presence of the German participation in MINUSMA until May 2024 and just then to begin the transfer back of the forces.

For this, an additional half billion euros shall be thrown after the previous costs of the Mali mission of approximately four billion euros, without being able to expect an added value or sustainable uses from this mission.

Consequently, we reject the motion put forward by the Federal government for a continuation of the Bundeswehr's participation in MINUSMA and demand the immediate beginning of a rapid, controlled departure of all German forces from Mali.

I am grateful.

 

[trans: tem]

 

 

Joachim Wundrak, May 13, 2022, National Security Council

German Bundestag, May 13, 2022, Plenarprotokoll 20/35, pp. 3333-3334.

Herr President. Valued colleagues.

Following these emotional themes, a more sober, political theme. For years, no, for decades is discussed in professional circles in Germany the theme of a lack of a national security policy comprehensive strategy. In times of crisis, the theme briefly attains the attention of the political parties and the media, and then again disappears from the discussion.

Up to today, the strategic reality was that Germany out-sourced its energy policy to Moscow, its economic policy to Peking and its security policy to Washington, and the rest for the most part will be decided in Brussels. The German security policy thus for long is lacking in setting long-term national security goals so as to do justice to the Basic Law’s promises to the German citizens of peace, freedom, security and prosperity. 

Germany thus increasingly is no match for the present challenges of a dramatically changing world order and an international competition of systems becoming ever harsher. The origin of this is the lack of a long-term, realistic, stringent national strategy free of ideology which clearly and distinctly formulates German interests. It is thus to be fundamentally welcomed that the Federal government has resolved in its first year in office to put forward a national security strategy. Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister’s estimate put forward in regards the initial event for the development of such a national security strategy clearly falls short.

To work up a national security strategy, to critically and continuously evaluate and update this in its entire breadth, and before all to survey and to enforce its implementation, cannot be the responsibility of a single department. This must unconditionally be the central point. The obvious weak points of the crisis management in connection with the Ukraine war emphatically underline this.

Domestic and foreign security policy developments already for long no more allow themselves to be considered separately. Present and future complex challenges can only be overcome when foreign, defense, domestic, economic and energy policy dimensions are incorporated and applied to well understood national interests.

Durable realpolitische solutions and strategic security policy decisions require a far look forward as well as clearly defined national security policy goals. If such a realpolitische interpretation [Durchdringung] of the world situation is not put forward, the Federal government in the best case can react in the short-term to critical events. We well enough know these passages by sight from the last years. Mid- and long-term, this policy nonetheless leads to further loss of freedom of action in foreign, security and economic policy and thereby to an increasing dependency on other powers. With the utmost pain, we directly experience this, especially in the failed energy policy in connection with the war in the Ukraine and its consequences. Germany thus needs to be in the position to prevent the threatening decline in the international concert and also to be able to enforce its national interests which have to serve the welfare of the citizens.

Against this background, we propose [Drucksache 20/1746] to comprehensively reconstruct the present Federal Security Council into a standing, inter-departmental [Ressortübergreifenden] National Security Council and with efficient and lean structures to build – not unconditionally according to the American, rather according to the French and Japanese and yet also to the Austrian model.

            Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU/CSU): That is an interesting mix!

This National Security Council is formed together with, in a broad sense of security, the relevant ministers and will be led by the Chancellor. A National Security advisor, who is placed directly under the Chancellor and whose staff is settled in the Chancellor’s Office, leads the daily business of this National Security Council. For that, it also has access to the relevant information, particularly to the respective central stores of all affected departments.

With this toolbox [Instrumentarium], the Federal government should be placed in the position to develop preventive and long-term strategies into a German national comprehensive security strategy and then to institutionalize and implement it. So as to democratically legitimate this distinct strengthening of the Chancellor’s position in the executive, an appropriate parliamentary control committee should be installed.

Valued colleagues, against the background of the increasing insecurity and risks in the world, I ask you to queue the partisan political considerations and vote for our motion.

Many thanks for your attention.

 

[trans: tem]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Joachim Wundrak, April 7, 2022, Libya

German Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 20/28, p. 2434.

Frau President. Valued colleagues. Ladies and gentlemen.

We debate today on a Bundeswehr mission which in many regards is controversial. Irini is the successor operation of Operation Sophia which in 2019 due to a dispute, particularly between Italy and Germany, needed to be suspended.

Background for the suspension of Sophia was the dispute over the mandate for rescue at sea of migrants which conflicted with another mandate, namely halting the trafficking [Schleuser] criminality. The Italian government at that time correctly pointed to the contradiction of this mission stoking the trafficking activity, by which the presence of the Sophia ships was included in the calculation of the traffickers.

            Ulrich Lechte (FDP): That is just rubbish!

A similar evaluation came from the British Parliament which more than once designated the Sophia mission as failed.

A core mandate of the successor operation Irini now is the implementation of the Security Council’s resolution for an arms embargo against Libya. To a secondary mandate belongs the gaining of information on human smuggling and on illegal exports of petroleum from Libya.

How does the balance of the mandate’s fulfillment now appear after two years? Here for one is the unevenness in regards the enforcement of the arms embargo. This is in flagrant contrast to the EU’s claim to guarantee strict neutrality vis-à-vis the parties to the conflict. The elected government of Libya criticizes that it is one-sidedly disadvantaged by the arms embargo at sea, while the combatant Haftar may be supplied with weapons via land and air connections. Among the supporters of the government side are found prominent NATO partners, among whom are also three EU members. On the other side, Russia and the Ukraine especially deliver considerable weapons systems to Haftar.

It is thus, ladies and gentlemen, not to be wondered that the enforceability of Irini is close to nil. This is very clearly indicated by multiple attempts to control ships commissioned by Turkey and under suspicion of being underway in the transport of weapons in western Libya. Turkey vehemently resists the searching of the ships, and succeeds in all cases. Only one tanker with kerosene for eastern Libya was confiscated because it was agreed that this was for military purposes instead of for allegedly civilian aviation.

Here we are at the keyword: The oil business, as everyone knows, is the true background of the on-going conflict in Libya. The large European oil firms are present and attain high profits. And both parties to the conflict work profitably together in the oil business so that there exists little interest in an alteration of the status quo.

Thus one must come to the evaluation that the mission in the framework of Irini only very insufficiently, if at all, fulfills the mandated commission. It is thus essentially a question of a show window mandate for the EU so as to promote its security policy ambitions, GSVP [Common Security and Defense Policy] and PESCO [Permanent Structured Cooperation].

Against the background of the present security policy situation – and here I agree with Frau Minister Lambrecht – it would be far more sensible and fitting to concentrate our navy’s expense of time and resources on the core mandate of the Bundeswehr, namely the defense of the States and Bund, primarily in the Baltic and the North Sea. We therefore regard this new mandate Irini as superfluous.

Thank you for your attention.

 

[trans: tem]