German Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 21/102, pp. 12934-12935.
Honored President. Esteemed colleagues. Right honorable citizens.
In 1995, the Constitution Protection in its report introduced for the
first time its own sub-chapter for technology transfer controlled by
intelligence service. The central point, then as today: The People’s
Republic of China. Yet in view of this threat, not a single thing came
from government beyond the development of handouts and offers to
consult. Obligatory and really sharp measures against the theft of our
research results have, as before, not been struck – thus: A nil return.
Let us speak in clear text: German businesses and research facilities
were for decades robbed, systematically and state-organized. Now
shall the national platform for research security correct that.
In 1995, the Constitution Protection in its report introduced for the
first time its own sub-chapter for technology transfer controlled by
intelligence service. The central point, then as today: The People’s
Republic of China. Yet in view of this threat, not a single thing came
from government beyond the development of handouts and offers to
consult. Obligatory and really sharp measures against the theft of our
research results have, as before, not been struck – thus: A nil return.
Let us speak in clear text: German businesses and research facilities
were for decades robbed, systematically and state-organized. Now
shall the national platform for research security correct that.
Joachim Ebmeyer (CDU/CSU): Precisely!
Yet even here applies only the well-known formula “coordinate,
inform, consult” – everything voluntary, nothing compulsory.
This naïve attitude endangers our prosperity and the national
security. That is irresponsible.
The consequences of this hair-raising cluelessness are lately
shown at the Helmholtz Center for Research Security. There
where our cyber-security is researched, according to the minister’s
statements, "the floodgates stand wide open”. We thus need reckon
that research results reached institutes in China which have been
strictly sanctioned by the U.S.A.. In that regard, we know that since
2017 every citizen in China is legally obligated to cooperate with
the intelligence services.
In view of this, who sets up only voluntarism and consultation
manages an organized denial of reality.
Till Steffen (Greens): That which the AfD does voluntarily!
States like the U.S.A. or Canada have understood that an open
scientific system can only be protected if clear rules are set up and
enforced. Research security is not a contradiction of the freedom
of science.
Till Steffen (Greens): …but for the AfD’s policy!
It is its guaranty of survival. We thus orient with our motion
[Durchsache 21/554] and demand among other things:
First. Who lays claim to the Bund’s research means needs to
regularly publish conflicts of interest, side activities and respective
foreign financing.
Filiz Polat (Greens): Do that for once!
Second: Security concepts are not non-compulsory
recommendations. They need be a strong and investigative
prerequisite for promotion of security and economic projects.
Nicole Höchst (AfD): So it is!
Third. Guest scientists and students from states under suspicion
of managing espionage against our key technologies need to go
through a deepened security examination.
Till Steffen (Greens): Have you spoken with Herr Krah?
That’s an important question! You had a perpetrator in
your delegation! You should speak with Herr Krah about
that! I believe that will be an interesting talk!
We require obligatory and effectively preventative rules for
protection of our research.
Vice-president Bodo Ramelow: Herr member.
Let’s make Germany strong again!
Sonja Lemke (Linke): Which “again”?
[trans: tem]