AfD Bundestag Delegation, July, 2025.
To shape Germany politically – the end of the firewall and
the way to government responsibility.
Ideas and proposals for a strategy process of the AfD
Bundestag delegation.
Introduction
The AfD achieved a great success at the last Bundestag
election. It dislodged the SPD as the second strongest power in Germany and has
become by far the strongest power in eastern Germany. In Germany, there is a
clear middle-right majority with which the migration change and the economic
change can be implemented.
Despite the great election success and the voters’ large
assent, the firewall prevents a sharing in the government by the AfD, the
exclusion of the AfD continues to be enforced, and the AFD is even threatened
with a ban. To become a permanent people’s party, to overcome the firewall and
to pave the way to government responsibility is an enormous challenge for which
a strategy is required. The following paper offers proposals for an AfD
delegation strategy process in the German Bundestag.
Prerequisite for the fall of the firewall and government
responsibility for the AfD:
The AFD strives for government responsibility in Germany. The
actions of the black-red coalition prove that neither a migration change nor an
economic change is possible without the AfD as a driving power in the government.
The political change in Germany is only to be achieved when the AfD overtakes
the government responsibility. So that the AfD can design politically, the the
firewall needs to fall.
The firewall will fall and the way for assumption of
government responsibility will be open when
1. The
AfD is firmly anchored by its core voters who vote for the AfD out of adherence
and conviction, the AfD exploits additional parts of its potential, and has
clearly gained in acceptance beyond the AfD voter base (Part I).
2. Other
party-overlapping coalitions are no longer possible because the rift between
Union and the leftist parties can no longer be bridged (Part II).
In the following will be sketched possible ways of creating
the prerequisites for such a scenario.
Part I. Create
majorities – the people for the government responsibility won by the AfD.
For the analysis, we separate into three relevant groups the
electorate for the AfD: The AfD’s voter base, the AfD’s potential, and the
scope of acceptance [Akzeptanzumfeld].
To the AfD’s voter base belong
those who with great certainty vote for the AfD and can be permanently united
to the AFD.
The potential are those voters who
basically can imagine themselves voting for the AfD and who also are attainable
as possible voters.
The scope of acceptance are those
voters who do not vote for the AfD and do not intend doing so, yet under
certain circumstances may welcome or at least do not reject a government
participation by the AfD.
According to INSA, the AfD’s voter base is around 18
percent; additionally, with the present voters and the potential voters, the
AfD could achieve up to 30 percent of votes. Yet even if the AfD completely
exploited its potential, that is no guaranty for the end of the firewall and a
participation in government. In addition, there needs be a scope of acceptance
which indeed does not vote for the AfD, but is not unfavorably opposed to a participation
in government by the AfD.
So that the AfD can attain government responsibility in
Germany and shape the Politik in
Germany, it needs to permanently unite to itself its voter base, exploit the
greater portion of its potential, and expand and attain a basic acceptance of
its participation in legislation and government. For all three groups, voter
base, potential, scope of acceptance, the AfD requires a differentiated
strategy.
1. Unite base voters: Ostdeutsche, workers, rural area, young
voters, Russlanddeutsche.
The goal is to create a tight milieu anchoring and a
permanent voter base. Voters should not vote for the AFD primarily out of
protest or frustration, but because they identify themselves with the AfD. In
the following milieus and regions, a tighter anchoring is already visible:
Ostdeutsche,
workers, citizens in villages and small and mid-sized cities, Russlanddeutsche and Germans from the
post-Soviet space, and first time voters, especially young men.
So as to permanently unite the voter base to the AfD and to
strongly anchor the AfD in these milieus, the delegation prepares in three
areas:
The AfD delegation identifies the
political interests and problems of these groups and develops concrete
legislative initiatives which therein aim to accomplish the base voters’
concrete interests and to improve their living situation.
The AfD identifies the channels of
communication and creates referral networks so as to continually and
permanently communicate with the base voters.
The AFD works towards a positive
self-image of the base voters and their sense of life which is tightly bound with the AfD.
The AfD directs to this purpose work groups which identify
the interests of base voters, develops a communications strategy, and draws up
a positive picture of these groups; for example, workers as the providers of
performance, Ostdeutsche as an avant
garde of democracy and freedom, rural people as carriers of good, traditional
values, young Germans as bearers of hope of a better future. Thus shall be
developed a common AfD purpose image as a free, conservative people’s party
which embraces its voter coalition.
2. Identify potential: Over-60
generation, women, academics, churched [kirchcennahe]
Christians, big cities.
In regards specific groups, the election results clearly
lagged behind. The following groups can be identified in which the AFD has not
exploited its potential and which represent a large portion of the German
people:
Women, citizens with a college education, citizens in big
cities and metropolitan areas, voters over 60, and professing [konfessionsgebundene] Christians.
These groups are not homogenous and cannot be addressed as a
unit. So as to increase and win for the AfD these hard-to-access groups, we
require a socio-demographic micro-analysis of these groups. Partial groups need
to identified to be able to build a bridge to them.
Examples of such partial groups:
A partial group of women is, for example, housewives and
mothers; of academics, engineers and graduates of technical training; of big
cities and metropolitan areas, citizens in focal points or outlying locales; in
regards the over-60 generation, pensioners concerned about crime or older
people with traditional values; and a partial group of professing Christians is
conservative Protestants and Catholics.
The delegation’s work groups should deeply occupy themselves
with the social groups in which the AfD is weaker. They may identify hindrances
and problems at talks with these groups and develop solutions, find sub-groups
which may be addressed for the AfD, and propose measures for themes and a communications
strategy so as to become stronger in these groups.
3. Enlarge
the scope of acceptance.
Even strong elections results are no guaranty for an AfD
participation in government. As important to the mobilization of base voters
and to the address to potential voters are concrete public opinion indicators
for the scope of acceptance: Surveys of AfD Verbot
procedures, for acceptance of various forms of cooperation with the AfD, for
government participation and for fundamental rejection and fear of the AfD.
The goal is to reduce below 50
percent the portion of voters who express fear of the AfD, who are for banning
the AfD and who reject a cooperation with the AfD.
For that, it is important to analyze by means of collections
of public opinion which negative images, negative narratives and notions of the
AfD exist, and how these are mediated and strengthened. On the basis of the
knowledge is then a proper strategy developed for a targeted
counter-communication which refutes the arguments against the AfD, a positive
purpose image developed, and proposals formulated on how the scope of
acceptance can be clearly enlarged. The target groups of our efforts for
enlarging the scope of acceptance are:
Citizens who do not belong to the
voter base or the potential of the AfD, and whose rejection on the basis of
their ideological location and party affiliation is not insurmountable.
Part II. Split
black-red – Prevent party-overlapping coalitions.
Majorities without the AfD were hitherto possible by means
of party-overlapping coalitions, coalitions of the Union with the SPD or
Greens. The firewall will fall when these political options have failed and are
no longer possible. In the end, the Ampel
broke down because the opposition between the expectations of the FDP”s bürgerliche voters and those of
red-green were ultimately no longer bridgeable. The conflict potential between
the CDU/CSU and the SPD, especially between the conservative market economy
wing of the Union and the SPD-Linke, is especially great. The AfD has two ways
to enlarge these rifts:
1. The polarization of debate leads
to the separation of bürgerliche-conservative
camps from leftist radical camps: The demarcation [Abgrenzung] of the radical leftists, who for the majority of
Germans represent unacceptable positions, facilitates the AfD positioning
itself as a bürgerliche-conservative
power. The strengthening of the radical leftists proceeds at the cost of the
SPD and Greens, and forces these onto a course which makes the agreements with
the Union considerably more difficult.
2. The pressure on the CDU/CSU
increases: The AfD will launch motions and initiatives which meet with a high
agreement within the Union voter base, especially the voters who voted for the
CDU/CSU for a migration and economic change, yet now are disillusioned by
black-red. Besides the migration change, the AfD takes in view the economic
change as a central theme field so as to increase the pressure on the Union and
make accessible new competences and voters for the AfD.
1. Polarization against the Linke.
1.1 Drive
forward separation of the bürgerliche-conservative
camps from Leftist camps.
Presently, polarization in Germany proceeds all too often between
AfD voters and all others. Our aim is to create a situation in which the
political rifts no longer run between the AfD and the other political streams,
but a bürgerliche-conservative camp
and a radicalizing leftist camp oppose one another, comparable to the situation
in the U.S.A.
The starting point for such a development is given:
The Linke have become a driving
power in the leftist camp which makes it difficult for the Greens and SPD to
engage in compromises with the CDU/CSU; for example, in regards migration and
economy.
The AfD and the Linke form the two
ideological poles of the social argument. As a counter-pole to the ideological
and woke Linke, the AfD can sharpen its bürgerliche
profile.
The AfD can essentially contribute
to that the argument in politics and society becomes a “duel” between the two
irreconcilably opposed camps, culminating in an election between the AfD and
Linke: Weidel or Reichinneck.
The consequences of this polarization already show
themselves with the Bundestag election in regards the first-time voters. There,
the FDP and Greens were relieved as the strongest political powers by the AfD
and Linke. If this trend spreads through the entire electorate, the political
poles will be stronger, the rifts between both camps greater. The rifts within
the camps, such as between AfD voters and CDU/CSU voters, becomes smaller
because the Linke have a strong interest in attacking even moderate
conservative and CDU-like positions as being close to the AfD.
1.2
Differentiate communications strategy.
The communication needs to be thematically, rhetorically and
argumentively differentiated between the argument with the opposing leftist
camp and the argument within the bürgerliche-conservative camp.
The argument with the leftist camp
will be conducted on a fundamental level with the central point on socio- and
cultural-political basic conflicts: Family
versus gender, nation versus open borders, freedom versus socialism.
The argument with the Union needs
to be primarily conducted on the themes of credibility and trust, substantially
[konkret] on the political failures
in regards the practical implementation of the migration change and economic
change.
In a Kulturkampf
with the Linke, the AfD positions itself as the only relevant opposing force;
as the credible original in political competition with the CDU/CSU, it delivers
what the Union in the election campaign has only promised.
2. Political pressure on the Union.
2.1 The AfD
can become the strongest party with variable voters from the CDU/CSU.
In the 2025 Bundestag election, the CDU/CSU gained four
million voters from the SPD, FDP and non-voters; 1.76 million voters from the
SPD, 1.35 million voters from the FDP and .9 million non-voters voted for the
Union. These new voters for the Union gave as a reason for the vote decision
that the Union after Merkel had changed course. Economic growth, domestic security
were the most important themes of the CDU/CSU voters.
If the AfD succeeded in winning these variable voters from
the CDU/CSU, it will be the strongest power and expel the Union to the second
place. If the AfD gained these four million voters, the absolute number of its
voters climbs from ten to 14 million. That corresponds to an election result of
about 28 percent, which largely corresponds to the AfD’s measured voter
potential. The CDU/CSU would correspondingly lose votes and come out even worse
than in 2021, as it attained with its Chancellor candidate Armin Lachet a
historic low of 24 percent.
For that it may succeed in motivating these new Union voters
to a change to the AfD there speaks:
That these
new CDU/CSU voters have already shown themselves ready to change
That they
have voted out of protest against the Ampel
CDU/CSU
That they
are in agreement with the AfD’s positions on domestic and economic policy
That the
Union by its coalition with the SPD disillusioned these groups of voters
The way to win these earlier SPD, FDP and non-voters, who at
this election gave their votes to the Union, lies in, besides the migration
policy, the key question of economic competence.
The Union stands before the dilemma that compromise with the
SPD makes it easy for the AfD to win these voters from the Union – the fight
over these voters inevitably brings it into conflict with the SPD and Greens.
2.2 The AfD as the party of the sozial market economy: Overtake the
CDU/CSU in economic competence.
The “core brand” of the CDU/CSU lies in its economic and
financial competence. In the voters’ attributions of competence prior to the
Bundestag election, it was far ahead of all other parties. “Economic growth”
was a central motiv for the election of the CDU/CSU. The AfD strongly increased
in these competence fields in the last Bundestag election, yet still lay far
removed from the Union’s competence values other than in regards to that of
migration where the competence attributions lay more closely one with the
other.
The economic competence is the key question so as to exploit
the potential, to win the Union’s variable voters, and to enlarge acceptance
for the AfD’s government responsibility. The goal is to essentially reduce the
Union’s margin in regards attribution of competences in the areas of economy
and finance, and to conclusively overtake the Union. In the eyes of the voters,
the AfD needs to stand not only for the migration change but also for the
economic change.
The starting point for that is given:
The lifting of the debt brake cost
the Union considerably in credibility. The growing state debt and interest
burden will become in the coming years a permanent theme.
As a result of the coalition with
the SPD, wide-ranging and necessary structural reforms are practically
impossible. The massive problems for Germany as a business venue and for the
social security system are not to be solved by the least common denominator of
the CDU/CSU and SPD.
The AfD can make market economy, ordnungspolitische and financial policy
demands and program points of its own without the Union, as a result of its
captivity in the coalition with the SPD, being able to oppose something
credible to it.
The AfD is the only party which,
without regard to leftist climate discourse, can acknowledge itself for
economic growth and can act in the central energy themes without ideological
restrictions.
The theme of economic growth and the prosperity promises
united with it, besides the themes of migration and domestic security, can be
an additional mainstay for the AfD, and at the same time be the clothes pin
between the AfD’s various voter groups: From the unemployed to workers to the
self-employed, from the former SPD to the former FDP voters, and also thereby
for CDU/CSU’s variable voters.
3. Foreign policy should create no additional problems.
The base electorate as well as the AfD’s potential voters are
primarily to be addressed by means of domestic and economic policy positions.
The AfD’s foreign policy positioning has the duty to avoid controversies within
its own electorate, to minimize areas of attack and thereby contribute to
enlarging the AfD’s scope of acceptance. A duty of AfD foreign policy is to
early identify the danger of potential internal conflicts and current negative
effects for the AfD by a wise
positioning and a stringent communication agreed to within the
delegation.
Outlook: Use the
members’ experience and competence.
An overall strategy, especially in regards to the many
various voter groups, should use the experience and competences of the members
of the Bundestag delegation. The delegation has at its disposal comprehensive
knowledge from its voter circles, from the citizen contacts, and a reservoir of
life and vocational experience with which that of no other delegation is
comparable.
In a strategy process itself arise new ideas, especially in
the address to the base voters, the potential, and the scope of acceptance, but
also in regards considerations of tearing down the firewall and opening the way
for government ability. Work groups for individual voter groups make it
possible to speak beyond the usual snips of political themes, of access to the
various target groups, and to speak of the solution of outlined problems, to
use experiences, gather together ideas, to use available sources, so that they
can flow into the overall strategy.
The socio-empirical evaluation and analysis and strategic
adaptation is thereby a permanent duty with the goal of optimizing our result
and making possible the political change in Germany.
[trans: tem]